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The article offers an overview of the development political theory in Hungary in the past quarter 
of a century. It is written from a personal perspective, yet it is intended to be impartial and 
exhaustive. It follows a chronological order and puts the issue into a political and institutional 
context, with a special emphasis on the regime change that took place between 1988-90. 
Wherever necessary, the historical antecedents and intellectual traditions of contemporary 
Hungarian political theorising will be reflected on. Political theory itself will be discussed as being 
composed of three main branches, namely, empirical, analytical and normative theories. The 
overall conclusion will be that the predominantly liberal atmosphere of the 1990es was gradually 
replaced by a more conservative one, and that, strongly related to both the international 
tendencies and the domestic political developments, the so called agonistic interpretation of 
politics in general and of democracy in particular has become the mainstream approach in 
Hungarian political theory. 
 




My purpose is to offer an overview of political theory in Hungary in the past quarter of a 
century. The country is relatively small and its language is rather forbidding to foreigners. 
However, opening a window on it in terms of political theory might be interesting not 
only in and for itself but also as a case study of the challenges political theory must face 
in communities that are both closed (to foreigners) and wholly integrated in the Western 
culture (as natives think), and that have been affected by profound historical changes.2 
Although I do not think that political theory “should” either guide (and criticise) or track 
down (and explain) such political changes, it is a natural expectation that theoretical 
reflection turns out to have been affected by them and that especially during rapid 
changes and a loss of clear normative orientation, theories may be directly called for and 
in by those actively forming the political processes, emerging institutions and generally, 
the constitutional and legal framework of a country. I shall thus try to pay due attention 
to these interactions and the forms of mutual influence. However, my focal point will be 
the development of political theory as a (sub)discipline.  
I shall follow a chronological order, beginning with the antecedents of the regime 
change in terms of political theory, turning to the long moment of the change itself, and 
then taking stock with the past two decades, reflecting on changes of the institutional 
and political context when and where it seems relevant. However, although my overview 
is meant to cover twenty-five-thirty years but wherever and inasmuch as it is necessary to 
reflect on traditions, these brief reflections will not be spared. Even though the regime 
change was indeed a dramatic turn in and for the freedom of thinking, talking, and 




writing, without external and internal(ised) constraints, making truly independent 
political thinking possible, a complete discontinuity, an absolutely new beginning would 
be a very counter-intuitive hypothesis. Concepts, problems, issues pertinent to “scientific 
socialism” were indeed rapidly replaced by those of democracy and of a free and 
sovereign polity, as I shall show, and of course there was no way back to the pre-war, 
elitist but constitutional authoritarianism colored with an old style liberalism and some 
sincere democratic developments.3 However, some parts of political theory, especially its 
normative and historical research areas, much as in any other Western commonwealth, 
are sensitive to their own traditions and I shall refer to them when and where necessary. 
It is also necessary to remember that political theory, as any other  field of 
science, is done in concrete academic and general institutional settings where it often has 
to compete for the resources, including not only money but students and prestige as 
well; and that political theory is especially vulnerable to misinterpretations and political 
abuse. Whenever it seems important, I shall reflect on these problems, too. 
Let me add some methodological qualifications and disclaimers here. First, I do 
not intend to tell in what political theory consists, where its borders lie, whether it 
belongs to philosophy or to political science, whether it can be pursued in a purely 
formal way or always with reference to some historical, political, cultural, whatever 
context. I will use a classification that I hope is as uncontroversial as possible. This 
includes three classes: (i) the empirical, (ii) the analytic, and (iii) the normative 
approaches. Second, “in Hungary” means political theory being done within and for the 
political community of Hungary. Scholars of Hungarian origin but working in a different 
political culture will be covered only insofar as they have influenced the scholarship of 
their native country, that is, as any other relevant author from the international 
community. (Naturally, many of them have preserved a distinctive interest in their native 
country.)4 Thirdly, and finally, this overview is not objective in the sense of being 
supported by numbers and calculations. There are no exact data, say, of the kind impact 
factors are measured today. Building up such a background would require an immense 
research of which I am not capable now. Hence, the relevance of the overview is 
constrained. Its credibility stems from my personal involvement, experience, and the 
suggestions and recommendations of those who read the paper and that I have all taken 
into account when completing this overview. 
 
2. Pre-Regime Change Antecedents 
 
Needless to say that the official Marxism-Leninism, prevalent and obligatory in the 
Soviet countries, did not recognize the scientific or philosophical autonomy of any kind 
of political thinking. It was “scientific socialism,” taught at universities by special 
departments, that was meant to cover problems related to the political and institutional 
order and identified by the party leadership, always according to the precepts of The 
Doctrine. Notwithstanding the prominence of the official doctrine, however, more 
independent thinking began relatively early in time, if not at those departments but in 
other institutions and within opposition circles.  
First, from the late sixties onwards, leftist criticism of Marxism has slowly taken 
ground. Most critiques, especially those that directly challenged the political core of 




Marxism, were suppressed and published only either abroad or in a samisdat form. 
Some, especially those that attacked the economic doctrine of socialism, were sometimes 
tolerated, perhaps due to the general reforming atmosphere. Especially interesting was 
Tibor Liska’s case who argued openly for a kind of fully competitive, enterpreneurian 
economy, yet preserving fundamental equality in terms of opportunities to everybody, 
anticipating, in effect, a contemporary version of luck egalitarianism (Bársony 1982). Janos 
Kornai’s devastating critique of the socialist economy, with the conclusion that it was 
inherently inefficient and unsustainable, was technical enough to pass the censorship yet 
made a tremendous impact on political economics afterwards.5 Samisdat publications 
and books published by the emigration and other dissidents abroad could of course exert 
only a very limited impact on the intellectual life and found their way back to home and 
the legal sphere after the regime change.6  
Second, after Gorbatchev had launched the perestroika, party and government 
institutes began to consider widening the legitimacy basis of the regime along more 
democratic principles, though not by allowing a multi-party system but by finding other 
institutional ways to articulate, channel and integrate “genuine” (that is, not directly 
political, and hence considered being unsubversive) social interests. A new constitution 
was being discussed, if only in party and government offices. There was a demand for 
legal theorists but certain independent political scientist (not bound by party discipline) 
could also propose general political reforms. I suggest, therefore, that immediately prior 
to the regime change (the exact date of which is, of course, indeterminable) thinking in 
terms of legitimacy, democracy, the inherent plurality of interests, autonomy, the 
constitutional protection of the private sphere and individual rights had already been on 
the wake, and had made researching and teaching “scientific socialism” an obsolete 
business. Those deeply involved in the reform zeal did not make precise distinctions 
between the different compartments, responsibilities and competences of political 
theory. Democracy and its types were not discussed, only “democratisation.” There was 
much talk about interests, yet little about values. Grandiose schemes of institutional 
reform were put on table, that were quickly adjusted to “political realities,” yet seldom 
confronted with social reality and historical experiences. Long-forgotten and/or 
forbidden authors of the early twenties (such as Bukharin or Gramsci) were discovered 
but quickly forgotten again. Public discussions of reform were still seriously restricted. 
There was a dizzy and quickly changing atmosphere, a general excitement and 
expectation of new and new things to happen, which made a more time-demanding and 
consuming theoretical research practically impossible.  
 As a third source of political theory in Hungary I must name a single person. 
This was István Bibó, the greatest authority on the Left, yet for his moral standing in 
1956 also held in high esteem by the Right. For as a member of the Imre Nagy Cabinet 
he was the only minister in Parliament on duty when the Soviets arrived. Later he was 
imprisoned for some years but essentially silenced for the remainder of his life. 
Bibó, whose political and intellectual formation began in the pre-war era, and 
who joined the leftist-agrarian critics of the Horthy regime, did not develop a consistent 
political theory. Rather, he took up various issues in his oeuvre, many of which reflect on 
actual political problems yet always with a keen theoretical sense.7 Put together, they 
form a characteristically Bibóian way of thinking. The perhaps most significant 




component of it is a very strong pro-democratic cornerstone. His most frequently cited 
and today proverbial statement is that ’to be a democrat amounts to not being afraid’ 
(originally he meant not fearing the opponent, yet many interpretations take this to 
allude to a general civic courage). His view of democracy was both progressivist and 
optimist, clearly influenced by the Enlightment and generally, the various emancipation 
movements; but also conservative due to its concrete, particular, institutional approach. 
Bibó wrote his dissertation in legal theory, where he interpreted freedom strictly in terms 
of rights and norms. He held socialist-egalitarian views on capitalism (advocating 
collectivisation and redistribution of property), liberal views on the separation of state 
and social powers, and conservative-socialist views on social progress, guided revolution, 
and the need to reform society from above, by a strong elite. And he had an acute 
historical sense as well, interpreting the modern history of Hungary, but also of Central-
Europe, including Germany, in terms of collective psychosis, surviving cultural and 
political patterns shaped by historical experiences – again, a typically conservative 
approach. His most famous categories by which he tried to explain many failures of 
modern Hungary are the predominance of, and pernicious opposition between, 
“overstrained essence-visionaries” and “fake realists” in Hungarian politics. He 
condemned visionaries for being incapable of taking politics seriously and for ignoring 
practical issues and feasible solutions; and fake realists for being too much prepared for 
accepting immoral compromises and thereby enhancing general corruption. Despite 
being a leftist, he was also a staunch opponent of Marxism and its historical materialist 
doctrine.  
It is no wonder that such an extremely motley version of normative and 
empirical political theory was both a source of inspiration to very different political 
tastes, and a way of thinking that as such could not be continued. What I take to be his 
greatest achievement for political theory and science is to show that it is possible to think 
of politics in its own terms, that is, not as a subfield of economics, moral philosophy, or 
philosophy of history. His works had provided a fertile ground for both normative and 
analytical political theory later.  
The fourth source of political theory was the literature on national identity. This 
may appear somewhat odd from a contemporary Western eye, yet it also has Western 
counterparts, in fact, a very rich tradition and inspiration to Central and Eastern 
Europeans. Herder, Fichte; Barrès, Maurras; Ortega, Unamuno belong to the classics; 
Baudrillard, Scruton, A. Bloom are contemporary examples of thinking in terms of how 
a political community, a nation exists, what its characteristics are, what intellectual, 
moral, political influences shape its identity, how the democratic sovereign as an artificial 
person looks like as a natural entity. Much of this literature is written in essayistic and 
other literary forms, academic journals rarely publish such papers but often discuss them. 
But both analytical and normative political theory deals with such problems, too, though 
of course in more rigorously defined terms. The former discusses questions of loyalty, 
political obligation, national identity, cultural and political nations; whereas the latter is 
concerned with cosmopolitanism, republicanism, democratic patriotism and 
cultural/political/ethnic nationalism.  
The specifically Central and Eastern European (including Russia) questions have 
ever been where “we belong to” and whether “we” have our own historical way to go or 




should/could, finally, join “the West.” Actually, Bibó himself was very much interested 
in this question, firmly believing that there have been serious derailments in the history 
of Central European nations but a return to the mainstream Western European history 
has always been possible. This was, essentially, the consensus among Hungarian 
conservatives and liberals of the 19th century. It was basically from the late 19th century 
on, influenced by German and French philosophy (see the names above), that some 
conservatives diverted from this consensus and began to believe in a more autonomous 
history of Hungary (hence the term “Hungarianness,” the content of which has ever 
been a subject of bitter political and literary debates). Radical liberals and socialists, 
however, become more and more doctrinaire in defending the supremacy of the West 
and were (and are) often called “alien-hearted” people by radical conservatives and 
nationalists.  
Strangely but logically, the Kádár-regime could build on both traditions: its 
socialist principles and Marxist-Leninist doctrine committed it to the standard humanist-
progressivist vision of mankind, whereas its loyalty to the Soviet Union helped certain 
rightist-conservative hostilities towards the West to survive. Its decline was marked by 
the resurgence of pro-Western tradition. Significantly for the emergent political theory, 
besides the Bibóian psycho-structural approach, historical non-Marxist structuralism also 
heavily influenced the discussion. It was especially the historian Jenő Szűcs’s short but 
very dense analysis of the “three historical regions of Europe” that was read widely 
(Szűcs 1983). Szűcs, under the influence of Bibó, the Weberian pre-war social historian 
István Hajnal, and the French Annalists, introduced and used institutional and structural 
terms in explaining the logic of development in each region, including power, state, top-
down and bottom-up social organising, separation of institutional competences, the 
organic evolution of differentiating private and public spheres, society and state (but not 
an independent economy) and so on. This was, in effect, a precious contribution to the 
vocabulary of an autonomous political theory as well.  
Observers of contemporary Hungarian domestic politics may note that this 
ideological-normative aspect of political theory has become very strong again, with the 
current government and its head repeatedly expressing its/his reservations about 
Western values (actually, disvalues) and preferring certain (randomly selected) Eastern 
societies. The consensus about the supremacy of the Western-liberal model that was so 
strong prior and during the regime change is clearly over. This rhetorical, in some ways 
practical, and perhaps increasingly political turn toward the East has strong historical-
ideological roots and hence deep reverberations in Hungarian society. 
Fifthly and finally, the work of historians of ideas and persons cannot be 
underestimated, either. Classics of Hungarian liberals and conservatives of the 19th 
century had never been prohibited to read, though they had never been a robust part of 
university education. Total censorship was basically restricted to rightists authors of the 
20th century, including not only straightforward fascists but also conservatives. Writings 
of other non-Marxist but leftist authors such as Oscar Jászi (a radical socialist, yet critic 
of Marxism) were published but selectively. From the mid-eighties, however, censorship 
was gradually eased and old-forgotten authors re-appeared both by their own right (new 
editions of old works) and as subjects of new monographs. There was an increasing 




awareness of the very rich and pluralist intellectual life of pre-war Hungary where various 
normative political conceptions were published and discussed.8  
 
3. Regime Change 
 
Let me return first to the institutional background of political theory during the regime 
change. Unlike in East Germany, what happened in Hungary and also elsewhere  in the 
former Eastern bloc was that the departments of “scientific socialism” were not 
dissolved but transformed into departments and institutes of political science, taught 
often by the same staff. This explains, from a sociological and psychological point of 
view, the initial mistrust towards political science within the educated elite and the new, 
emerging and victorious anticommunist parties and governments (Ehrhart 1998). It 
should also be added that the very early beginning of a highly combative political culture 
in Hungary made partisanship almost inevitable among political theorists as well: many 
of them were actively engaged in public debates, and became figures identified as either 
openly leftist or rightist. This has further contributed to the mistrust towards political 
theory (but also political science generally)  as a serious kind of science by the political, 
intellectual and media elites.  
Yet the more solid results and achievements of autonomous political thinking 
enumerated above helped political science and theory to take roots within the academic 
world. The first wave of analytical and normative theories and conceptions was 
overwhelmingly neo-Marxist, revisionist and post-Marxist/critical. The Polish political 
sociologist J. Wiatr (1998), the Italian political philosopher A. Gramsci, as well as N. 
Poulantzas, E. Miliband, Th. Skocpol, S. Lukes, V. Bunce, A. Giddens, Ph. C. Schmitter, 
R. Dahrendorf, C. Offe and others quickly replaced the canonical classics of Marxism. 
On the purely normative level, J. Habermas’s influence was initially very robust. His 
books were translated and taught extensively. In empirical theory, it was mainly 
neocorporativism and elitism that belonged to this wave. Interestingly, on the one hand, 
while corporativism was once a markedly conservative idea, its new edition influenced 
mainly the leftist theory of the state. The markedly peaceful, elitist, consensual, 
negotiated nature of the Hungarian transition (in Rudolf Tőkés’ term, the negotiated 
revolution) looked like the continuation (or merely acceleration) of the reforms that 
began in the mid-eighties and with which the former technicist-pragmatist but decidedly 
leftist elite identified itself.  
On the other hand, however, elitism that was once a characteristically leftist-
critical theory, has been embraced and increasingly endorsed by many conservative 
essayists in Hungary. The reason is the negative evaluation of the same story: the 
“negotiated revolution” was not a revolution at all. The continuation thesis should 
indeed be taken seriously but this makes matters even worse. There was no regime 
change at all, only the facade was repainted. The Right has interpreted (first the far right, 
today the middle right, too) the change as as a spurious and hypocritical one, with the 
old elite successfully preserving its power and influence, and hence a general normative-
democratic legitimacy crisis was diagnosed and a radical, truly “anticommunist”-antielitist 
revolution has been called for. Whether it did happen in 2010 with the Fidesz winning 
the elections by a two-third majority, is a question for a political discourse.  




Functionalism was also initially popular, though its very technical concepts and 
terms proved rather inefficient to wage such political wars. P. Bourdieu’s terminology 
(symbolic power, forms of capital) proved more useful and was duly exploited.9 Less 
directly critical of the new political elite and the new political order was the application 
of M. Foucault’s ideas and his conception of power to the interpretation of the history of 
modern Hungary and modernity in general.10  
 Another major, though often neglected or underestimated feature of the regime 
change and its immediate aftermath was the incredibly short time of translating and 
publishing previously unknown classics, ancients and moderns alike. It should be noted 
first, however, that even during the Communist era, the older classics such as Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Bodin, Rousseau, Tocqueville, Mill, Kant 
were more or less available (sometimes in shortened editions). Others were partly 
translated (Augustine, Scholastics, Renaissance thinkers, Scottish enlightment 
philosophers, Nietzsche). After 1989 a number of others such as Burke, Madison and 
other American Founders, Constant, Guizot, etc. were added, the shortened versions of 
other works were published fully, classic monographs (on Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, 
Montesquieu, etc. by Q. Skinner, R. Tuck, J. Dunn, J. Shklar, respectively) were 
translated, and the modern classics, from Carl Schmitt to Karl Popper, from Leo Strauss 
to M. Oakeshott, from I. Berlin to F. A. Hayek, from John Rawls to Charles Taylor, to 
name but a few, were also rapidly translated, introduced, explained, discussed and 
inserted into university curricula. Further, valuable selections of classic essays on 
liberalism and conservatism, communitarianism and nationalism, as well as encyclopedias 
and summaries of the history of political thought, were also added to the libraries.11  
Finally, there had been some relevant original scholarship done on classic authors 
even before the regime change. I do not only mean non-dogmatic Marx-research but the 
exploration of the anarchist tradition, the thinkers of the French enlightment (Mária 
Ludassy), 17-18 century British political thinking (László Kontler, Ferenc Horkay-
Hörcher, Balázs Trencsényi): this research was especially strong because of the 
international success and influence of the late István Hont who began his career as a 
historian of ideas in Hungary and helped new generations of historians from Cambridge 
to find their route to the international arena. On further developments in the field of the 
history of political thought see below.  
 
4. The Development of Political Theory After the Regime Change 
 
The foundations of autonomous political thinking having been thus laid down by 
translations, summaries, reviews, discussions, interpretations and some original work 
during the early nineties, the later phase of the development of political theory can be 
characterised by the growing awareness of the relative independence of its distinct 
compartments. As I indicated in the introduction, without making very substantial 
methodological claims, I shall distinguish between three major subfields of political 








4.1. Empirical theories 
 
This title might appear as a contradiction in terms inasmuch as theory and empirical 
research are often sharply distinguished, though, of course, considered to be in need of 
one another. Theory is based on empirical findings and empirical research is guided by 
theory. The point is, however, that political science as social science has its own 
characteristic, time-honored, tradition-supported questions and issues that have become 
focal points of both empirical research and pure theorising. What I have in mind is (i) 
the theory of democracy (classical, deliberative, leader types); (ii) theories of 
accountability, representation, mandating; (iii) theories of leadership, governing, decision 
making; (iv) theories of international relations; (v) theories of institutions, parties, 
movements, political systems and the state on supranational, national, subnational and 
local levels; (vi) discourse theory; (vii) theories of political sociology (recrutation of the 
political class, elite building and behaviour, voter behaviour, campaign studies, media and 
communication researches); (viii) formal models of voting and coalition forming; (ix) 
political economy; and (x) the contextualist school of the history of political thought and 
the study of political ideologies. As I said, these theories are rarely discussed in 
themselves but usually appear in empirical researches, contributing to the advancement 
of the respective subfield of political science. In this sense these theories may be 
considered as parts of the respective subfield and not part of political theory as a subfield 
of political science itself, with the possible exception of some purely theoretical, 
argumentative, or typological conceptions. However, these can perhaps be subsumed 
under another rubric (analytical and/or normative political theory). But such problems 
should not worry us here, since, to repeat, my purpose is largely taking stock with the 
output in the broadest possible sense. Let me thus expand on each subfield very briefly. 
 It may surprise a foreign reader to read that in an emerging democracy such as 
Hungary, with such an inspiring approach to democracy as Bibó’s, theorising about 
democracy does not really flourish.12 Compared to the state of the art as represented by 
the leading international journals, there has been almost no discussion about deliberative 
democracy and generally, on the meaning and context of democracy. It was only after 
the millenium that the concept of leader democracy has stirred up some interest, not 
unrelated to the growing influence of Carl Schmitt (more on that later) and the no less 
spectacular rise of Viktor Orbán on the political Right that was partly mirrorred by the 
strong personality of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the once-leader of the Socialist Party.13 Again, 
partly as a result of the decidedly combative nature of Hungarian domestic politics, the 
consensual theories of democracy have been largely neglected and the agonistic character 
of politics has been more widely accepted in political theory.  
 Problems of political representation and accountability, as well as of leadership 
and governing have become topics of systematic research only recently. There is an 
ongoing research, related to similar international efforts, to build, classify and analyse 
political-electoral promises, and even more recently, a leadership research has also been 
launched in the Institute of Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, that 
has gradually become the strongest foothold of academic political science.14 Theories of 
international relations, again, have duly become parts of the university education, about 
independent research being done in this field I have got only scarce knowledge. 




 More well-developed is the area of party research, again, for reasons of its more 
direct political urgency. Parties are always keenly interested in their electorate and are 
willing to spend on such researches, hence a significant amount of data has been quickly 
assembled and developed ever since the first elections. The principal question is, as I 
think in every emerging democracy, to conceptualise and analyse the effects of voters’ 
preferences on the electoral system and the behaviour of the parties and vice versa.15  
Analysing the continuously changing institutional system (government 
institutions, independent institutions, local governments) and the no less rapidly 
changing arena of political movements requires constant attention. Keeping record of 
them is a heavy task and there remains little room and energy to formalise and theorise 
on them, although the lessons of international debates on models of government, 
governance and good governing have been adapted and discussed in Hungary, too.16  
 Discourse theorists, however, established themselves as a school quite early and 
have produced translations (e.g. works of Koselleck), valuable selections of essays and a 
remarkable amount of independent research. They are thus perhaps the most 
consciously self-constructing school in political theory in Hungary. They must face the 
usual barrier to the international arena, namely, the limited accessibility of Hungarian 
domestic politics to foreigners which they study according to the precepts and ideas of 
discourse analysis.17  
 Political sociology and its various subfields are, as far as I can judge, mostly done 
by empirical researchers, except perhaps for network research which is supported and 
done by young scholars with a keen theoretical sense. They have done invaluable work 
by building up data bases (such as about the recrutation and carreer paths of politicians) 
and analysing them according to the received standards.18 The perhaps most interesting 
research results have been to control for the elitist theories about the regime change: was 
that really only a conversion of political capital into economic and social ones? How is 
the new capitalist Hungarian economy organised? What role does foreign capital play in 
building up regional and local networks?  
Game theory and its various applications such as coalition forming and 
committee voting are still relatively rare, partly due to the regrettable gaps in academic 
teaching of formal theories and models to political science students.  
 Studying political economy has had perhaps the strongest roots in empirical 
political theory in Hungary. The perhaps most reknown examples are Károly Polányi’s 
theory of economic transformation and Kornai’s theory of shortage economy. In the 
field of comparative system analysis, Mária Csanádi’s researches on the Hungarian, other 
East European, and the Chinese state and party system have earned international 
attention.19 During the first years of the transition, Hungary looked an interesting and 
unique case and some monographs and theories have been developed out of analysing it. 
There are other internationally established scholars in this field.20 However, a 
generational gap evolved in the nineties, due to some extent of talented economists 
having been absorbed rapidly by the new market economy, and it is only very recently 
that theories of international political economy have become subjects of study by young 
political economists.  
 I subsume the contextualist school of the history of political thinking to this 
chapter. Scholars working on authors of the great Western canon have already been 




mentioned. As far as the history of political thinking in Hungary is concerned, the first 
thing to note is the lack of a solid philosophical tradition in which political philosophy 
could have been embedded. Of course, right from the early 18th century there was a 
growing awareness of the great French, German and English authors (especially 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Herder, Locke, Burke: generally those whose ideas could be 
cited and interpreted in defense of public – and national – liberty against the Crown and 
the absolutist state). However, it was only from the 1840ies that different political 
ideologies were distinguished and began their career. No wonder that contextualism, that 
emphasises the historical embeddedness of a given ideological, political position and 
considers it untieable from the historical context, is the more persuasive position. Add to 
this the turbulences of history in Central Europe and one can doubt that there is much 
sense in talking about coherent liberal or conservative thinking in Hungary. Thus, given 
the huge differences of political, economic, social, and cultural contexts of the 19th and 
20th century and the lack of a philosophical background, many historians of political 
thought reject the idea of diachronically coherent political philosophical positions. The 
doyen of the historians of Hungarian political thinking, István Schlett, emphasises 
further that political thinking is different from political philosophical thinking: the latter 
may be missing, the former can still be robust and more relevant for political science. It 
is the political discussions of the day, and the thinking of those who actively shape 
politics, that is, of political actors that should be studied by scholars in the first place.  
Finally, and again somewhat strangely, the study of political ideologies as they 
appear in a contemporary pluralist society and democratic political order, is marginal, 
too.21 Due to the spectacular rise of the extreme Right in the past few years, there is a 
growing interest in the meaning of radicalism, populism, extremism; and there is an 
increasing awareness of the importance of ideas and values as they appear in politics and 
influence politicians’ and voters’ choices, yet the bulk of the literature on political 
ideologies, worldviews, systems of ideas is either partisan or purely normative. Liberals 
try to cope with liberalism, conservatives with conservatism, socialists with socialism 
either critically (criticising the others), or defending them. I shall return to them. But 
there is precious little empirical research being done how these positions have evolved, 
changed, and are related to one another in the ongoing political and philosophical 
debates.22  
 
4.2. Analytical theories 
 
This subfield of political theory is defined by analytical, conceptual, and 
phenomenological approaches to problems of politics that appear on a highly abstract 
level. Fundamental principles, values, and relations of politics are discussed here that in 
turn may and do inspire empirical researches as well.  
 A classic problem discussed by analytical theorists was legimitation. As I explained 
in the introduction, the Hungarian transition was characterised by the relative weakness 
of the democratic opposition that rejected the legitimacy of the Kádár-regime but had to 
admit that the Communists, and especially Kádár himself, could have easily won even a 
completely free elections as late as, say, the mid-eighties. This was indeed a perplexing 
problem and ever since the “negotiated revolution” of 1989 and the new constitution 




that was constructed step-by-step-wise and never legitimised for instance by a popular 
referendum, the legitimacy of the political order had been an open question.23 Since the 
adoption of the Basic Law in 2011 that replaced the old constitution was also a unilateral 
action of the governing coalition, the problem of legitimacy of the constitution has not 
disappeared. Yet I must acknowledge that despite the urgency of the problem, 
Hungarian political theorists have shown relatively little attention to it, and if yes, more 
in the nineties (Arato 2000).  
 Trust, on the contrary, belongs today to the most widely discussed issues not only 
in political science but also economics and sociology. It is fashionable internationally as 
well, and well-supported by ongoing empirical research (comparative surveys). On the 
whole, the Hungarian society is considered to be low in general trust and strong in family 
trust. This is regarded as providing for a particularly unfriendly environment for both 
democracy, and especially consensus-oriented, democracy; and for market economy 
where competition and cooperation are considered to be equally important.  
Sovereignty is usually discussed under the influence of Schmitt, once again, whereas 
power appears most frequently in its Foucauldian and Bourdieuian interpretation. Issues 
of human rights, authority, human dignity, political obligation and constitutionalism are mainly 
debated among legal philosophers.24 Concepts of H. L. A. Hart, R. Dworkin, J. Raz and 
others have been introduced and constructively discussed more in legal journals and less 
in political ones. Classical natural right theories are even less known and cited.25 This is 
somewhat odd and regrettable because the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been one 
of the most active and powerful institutions of its kind, and developed a very robust 
interpretation of the old constitution influenced by concepts of natural right and human 
dignity. Its decisions and rulings formed the political landscape of Hungary substantially, 
this is why I consider the negligence of its philosophy by political theorists somewhat 
strange. 
 Lastly and perhaps most importantly, I take the study of the political as the basic 
relation or quality of any politically existing human community to be the number one 
problem of analytical political theory. Arguably, the two most significant conceptions of 
the problem of what political existence entails are those of Carl Schmitt and Hannah 
Arendt. Whereas Schmitt’s theory rests on enmity and agonism, Arendt’s idea is the 
opposite: in her view, to exist politically amounts to be able to act in concert, where no 
public enemy, or foe, is existentially or conceptually required or presupposed. On the 
whole, as far as I can see, and again probably related to the predominantly agonistic style 
and reality of Hungarian politics, Arendt’s influence has been smaller that Schmitt’s, 
though Arendt herself devoted an important essay to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 
that she regarded to be an important historical evidence for her theory.  
Both Arendt’s and Schmitt’s most important works are available in Hungarian, 
with the regrettable lack of a translation of The Human Condition. Arendtians mostly 
comment on various aspects of her thinking but Schmitt’s concepts and ideas have 
inspired independent researches much like in other major Western countries. And 
similarly to the recent developments there, after the demise of Marxism or neo-Marxism 
as a common ground, it seems to me that Schmitt has become a remarkably popular 
author for both leftist (though not liberal) and rightist theorists. The state as the focal 




point of political theory has been definitely replaced by the political as the point of 
ultimate reference.  
It does seem that Schmitt’s thinking has taken on a sort of an emancipatory 
function for political theory in general. Certain empirical theories that were discussed 
above (leader democracy, discourse analysis in the first place) also demonstrate the 
influence of Schmitt’s conception of the political. Also, as I guessed above, the very 
combative nature of Hungarian politics, with deep animosities and sometimes hostilities 
between left and right, may have done much to prepare the rise of Schmitt’s theory. 
Finally, I also think that his obsession with the political has got not only theoretical but 
methodological and sociological functions as well. It is not just the nature, boundaries, 
and meaning of politics but of political theory, too, that can exploit the notion. Schmitt 
helps political theorists to explain (but also to hide) what they do and who they are. 
 
4.3. Normative theories 
 
Normative political theory or political philosophy can also be done in a more analytical 
and in a more historical way. The former approach is strongly related to the analytical 
theories and focuses on problems, issues, concepts, phenomena that are identified as 
being in need of some action (promotion, defense, preservation, justification, 
prohibition, etc.) grounded in and guided by certain philosophical insights. The latter 
approach deals with solutions and answers developed or suggested by previous authors 
in relation to these issues, and usually presupposes a conception of a tradition in which 
they, that is, both the authors and their conceptions, make some coherent and actually 
meaningful sense. In a particular political community, this latter approach may itself be 
further specialised insofar as certain universal positions (liberalism, conservatism) may 
turn out to have special meanings within the particular political history of that 
community, or there may be particular ideological positions and their history that are not 
really compatible with any universal ideology (especially those related to national 
identity).  
 As far as I can tell, within analytical normative political theory the Hungarian 
landscape mirrors most of the positions well-known in the international arena, of course, 
with a number of local characteristics and with considerable changes in terms of their 
influence and power over the past twenty years. Let me briefly take stock with them.  
(i) Egalitarian-Kantian liberalism was relatively strong in the nineties, its 
institutional stronghold (still) being the Central European University.26 With the crisis of 
liberalism in Hungary after 1998 (when the Fidesz first won the elections), however, the 
characteristic issues of liberal philosophy – equality, justice, fairness – have practically 
disappeared from the wider academic discourse, human rights remaining perhaps the 
only topic that has preserved its prominence, again, mostly related to the activity of the 
Constitutional Court. Topics related to hate speech and generally to the freedom of 
speech were perhaps those that were both well-connected to the ongoing international 
debates and to the actual problems of the Hungarian polity. For otherwise liberal 
political philosophy, at least in my judgment, gradually lost its sensitivity towards the 
actual needs and concerns of the Hungarian society and became a somewhat barren and 




doctrinaire moral creed. Those interested in the most abstract levels of philosophical 
discussion chose to publish in English rather than in Hungarian.  
(ii) Communitarianism is also present, though it is known mainly to political 
theorists. Some original interpretations and contributions of communitarianism have 
been produced, influenced by Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre and others.27 The 
call for a less individualistic political order has found some echo in the governing party 
that introduced the new Basic Law of the country in 2011. Without being able to support 
my claim with hard evidence, the sections of the Basic Law that promulgates basic rights 
and duties of citizens show clear signs of a communitarian position.  
(iii) Libertarianism or classical liberalism, in Hungary mostly associated with 
Hayek and Mises, two Central European authors, was especially strong during the regime 
change. I still remember the influx of books by libertarian authors donated by various 
pro-market American organisations. Hayek, but not Mises, is accessible in Hungarian. 
Especially during the nineties, Michael Polanyi’s works were also extensively translated. 
He began his career as a natural scientist and changed later to philosophy of knowledge 
and science. His thinking is not straightforwardly political but his concepts of personal 
knowledge, tacit knowledge, the impossibility of planned economy are both original and 
reminiscent of both Oakeshott’s and Hayek’s thinking.  
Strangely enough, well-known contemporary libertarians of Hungarian origin 
such as Thomas Szasz, Anthony de Jasay and Tibor Machan are virtually unheard of in 
Hungary.28 Since libertarianism is quite strongly rooted in economics and economic 
philosophy, I guess that its more profound and original reception would have required a 
more developed political economical background which was and is, however, still 
missing. Libertarianism is, thus, mostly represented by books, reviews, short notes, 
articles and it has, as I suppose it does in continental Europe elsewhere, a certain 
sectarian and doctrinaire ting. The recent economic crisis did much to further undermine 
the credibility of libertarianism, at least as it is interpreted by its critics, whereas 
libertarians who argue that the crisis resulted from state, rather than market, failures, are 
hardly heard.  
(iv) Especially after 1998, the popularity of conservatism has been on the rise.29 
As is well-known, conservatives are more reluctant to identify themselves as 
conservatives than liberals as liberals, because of the less ideological and systematic 
thinking of conservatism which is, therefore, usually a more personal philosophy than 
liberalism and is often more critical than constructive. In any case, Burkean-
Oakeshottean thinking has become pretty influential even among the younger, highly 
educated generation. Roger Scruton’s personal involvement in Central European politics 
(he actively helped dissidents in the eighties and has a good knowledge of Polish, Czech, 
Hungarian philosophy as well) made him a sort of intellectual celebrity in Hungary, too, 
with a number of his books having been translated. His championship of national states 
vis-a-vis the European Union has become especially welcome in the Right.  
Because of his Hungarian origin and interest in Hungarian affairs, John Kekes’ 
influence is also notable. His more analytical and unhistorical approach to conservatism 
is truly unique in Hungary. Again, due to their Hungarian nativity, Thomas Molnar’s and 
especially John Lukacs’s traditional, somewhat religious-reactionary conservatism (which 




are different, of course, in many aspects) is well-known. Their books have also been 
translated; Lukacs is especially widely read.  
The perhaps most profound Hungarian-born conservative thinker of the 
twentieth century is Aurel Kolnai. He also left the country very early. His thinking is 
perhaps the most pregnantly political philosophical and reflects both a highly 
autonomous intellectual development and a remarkably original approach to 
conservatism and a critique of utopian thinking. In his student years he was involved in 
the bourgeois radical movement and never ceased to be interested in Hungarian political 
history. His staunch anti-communism, born during the first Communist dictatorship in 
1919, preceded his conversion to conservatism in the fourties that was accomplished 
during his stay in the US. His intellectual return to Hungary was, again, made possible by 
the regime change and some of his most important political philosophical works have 
been translated. He, too, has exerted some influence on the strengthening conservative 
political philosophy after the millenium.30 
Neoconservative thinking is, however, known mostly from second-hand sources 
and reviews. The exception is Leo Strauss whose conservatism is, of course, a debatable 
question.31 On the whole, it is arguable that the rise of the Right after 1998, and 
especially after 2002 that led to their landslide victory of the 2010 elections, was 
intellectually quite prepared at the Budapest universities where conservative thinking has 
exerted considerable influence on students interested in politics.  
(v) Socialist-Marxist political philosophy was relatively strong during and after the 
regime change, as I explained earlier, but has almost disappeared in the past decade. 
Publications of socialist ideas and thinking was restricted to the journal Eszmélet. Here, 
again, the Hungarian origin of Istvan Meszaros has played a great role in making his 
magnum opus (Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition) attractive enough to be 
translated.32  
(vi) Other major positions such as republicanism or anarchism are, in the form of 
normative theories, practically unrepresented in Hungary. Worth mentioning are perhaps 
certain ultra-conservative circles, in certain ways similar to paleo-conservatism. By this 
term I mean those who criticise, even reject, democracy, favor strong monarchism and a 
more traditional, Platonist social order. One of their most respectable source of 
inspiration is Béla Hamvas, a truly unique thinker, who was a staunch opponent of 
Nazism/fascism, communism and liberalism alike. He did not, however, do proper 
political philosophy.  
 It is undeniable that the bulk of normative political theory is based on Anglo-
Saxon sources as in many other political communities of the Western hemisphere. But as 
I have pointed out, Carl Schmitt and Jürgen Habermas, as well as German conservatism 
and liberalism are very much present in Hungarian political thinking.33 Quite recently, 
there has been a growing awareness of French (and French-speaking) normative political 
thinking as well, though mostly in the form of translations (R. Aron, B. de Jouvenel, C. 
Lefort, P. Manent, Ch. Mouffe).  
 Let me repeat a point made above: especially in a small and relatively closed, 
internationally hardly notable political community much depends on the few personal 
relations that tie it to the international discourses. Kekes, Molnar, J. Lukacs, Hont, partly 
due to their native interest in Hungary, and others like Scruton or Habermas who have 




shown some particular interest in the region, have usually exerted not only a personal but 
philosophically formative influence on Hungarian political philosophy. 34 
Historical normative political philosophy is more concerned with the historical 
continuity and discontinuity, coherence and identity of the various positions and their 
interpretations based on classical texts. It is here that national traditions, local forms of 
universal ideologies are especially important. And as I argued, the history of political 
thought, both of its more universal and local versions, was researched quite extensively 
even at the dawn of the regime change in Hungary. Interest in authors long forgotten or 
never really studied was especially intensive after censorship was abolished. But the 
dominant approach has been, as I explained, a contextualist one. 
 Others acknowledge the significance of the contexts and of the thinking of 
political actors, yet maintain that just because both philosophies (and its different 
versions) are very rich and universal, they can serve as reliable proxies for evaluating the 
various political philosophical positions that had developed in Hungary over the two 
centuries. Further, strategic and constructive political thinking cannot be done without 
normative concepts, without some historical vision and practical philosophical sense. In 
other words, it is not the persons, nor the theorists but the ideas that appear and 
disappear in the writings of political thinkers (yes, not only of professional philosophers, 
but also of politicians, public intellectuals, novelists) that can and ought to be studied as 
forming a meaningful tradition and style of thinking: a political self, so to speak. 
Needless to say that those who favor a more contextual approach usually 
mistrust such a normative approach questions. But this debate is, once again, a different 
issue. Those who defend historical normative political philosophy (including myself) may 
also acknowledge that, for instance, 19th century liberalism, may no longer be relevant in 
and for actual Hungarian liberalism. Even less so because Lajos Kossuth’s national 
liberalism (of a Garibaldi-Mazzini-type) was very different from Count István 
Széchenyi’s conservative-utilitarian liberalism; Baron József Eötvös’s Tocquevillean-
Millian liberalism was different from Baron Zsigmond Kemény’s conservative-
constitutional liberalism. However, the differences are still meaningful, and though many 
of the once-relevant emphases and issues (such as Hungary’s role within the Habsburg 
Empire) are really outdated, they have shaped public attitudes, political thinking, cultural 
preferences and sensibilities profoundly.  
No wonder, of course, that it is especially conservatives who relish in researching 
their own tradition, believing that traditions themselves have authoritative power. In the 
19th century, straightforward conservatism was at the margins, but many of its 
attitudinal-emotional aspects are discernible in the best writings of the greatest 
Hungarian novelists. Social conservatism as a political ideological conception and 
program was elaborated and published by János Asbóth in 1875 in opposition to the 
doctrinaire, laissez faire liberalism dominant in the second half of the 19th century. 
Somewhat later the so-called bourgeois radicals, a group of social constructivists began 
to criticise the liberal consensus from the opposite angle, namely, because they perceived 
it as not only politically corrupt but intellectually outdated and provincial. After the First 
World War, liberalism had almost no more real defenders. However, its constitutional-
parliamentarian sensibilities, style, and unwritten norms were preserved in practice to a 
surprising extent, as I explained earlier. German-French-Italian type of radical or 




revoluationary conservatism, corporatism, fascism had its Hungarian followers but 
remained more contained by the political elite. Exploring these different positions and 
others was an old debt of Hungarian historians of political thought and consumed much 
energy during the past two decades.  
Thus, apart from Eötvös’s magnum opus published between 1851-54, it was only 
the 20th century that normative political theory in the strict sense became an 
autonomous subfield of political theory in Hungary, and distinguishable from the 
philosophically more inchoate thinking of novelists, politicians, social intellectuals.35 
Given the historical circumstances and the philosophical underdevelopment of the 
intellectual life of the country, truly autonomus Hungarian political thought could not 
begin until the regime change in 1989. However, in my view it still makes sense to 
assemble the pieces of earlier, context-bound political thinking that can be concatenated 
in a way that does not make traditions (liberal, socialist, or conservative) appear to be 
wholly arbitrary constructions but implicit, tacit, half-conscious, yet solid and reliable 
sources of political orientation even today. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Given the nature of this paper, any conclusion to be drawn from the overview can be 
only rather personal. But since this Issue is meant to be, as far as I understand, about 
memories, I think this provides me with some liberty to summarise the development of 
political theory in Hungary by choosing and pointing out those aspects that I deem to 
have been the most relevant ones.  
  The first point is that political theory did not begin in the regime change, it 
flourished before the war, though it was essentially suppressed during the Communist 
dictatorship. Much effort has been devoted to unearth these traditions, much of which 
turned out to be quite useless in the postcommunist world, yet perhaps paradoxically, 
contributed to the revival of some old, often outlandish debates on national identity, 
Hungarianness, and historical responsibilities. The second point is, again, a paradox: the 
negotiated, elitist character of the regime change initially supported a consensual 
interpretation of democracy in and by political theory, but it also provoked a harsh elitist 
critique of the transition which, in turn, made consensual approaches to democracy in 
political theory sound rather hollow. Thirdly, and in accord with this, the liberal, 
Western-type consensus about the nature of the new political order had to face 
increasingly strong criticisms raised by the Right. Hence, contrary to many Western 
patterns where liberalism is still a fighting force (for greater equality, justice, and rights), 
Hungarian liberal political philosophy found itself defending the existing order, whereas 
many conservatives became very critical of it, to the point of accepting theories usually 
held in high esteem in the Western Left. But since the millenium, liberalism has 
undoubtedly been on a decline, whereas conservatism, with its peculiar leftist concerns, 
has been on the rise. Topics and issues in political theory discussed in academic and 
public fora have reflected these changes. Fourthly, the influence of Carl Schmitt and his 
understanding of politics has grown ever since the late nineties. Political theorists seem 
to have found that Schmitt’s approach is a useful tool to entrench political science as an 
autonomous field among other social sciencies. Further, his agonistic view of politics 




appeared to be more congenial to Hungarian realities than any other rival theory. This 
gives further reasons why a more moral (Kantian-Rawlsian liberal) approach to political 
thinking has lost ground to the more realist schools of it. But it must also be noted that 
Schmitt’s and the realists’ increasing influence on contemporary political thinking is not 
restricted to Hungary. A growing number of articles and papers in international journals 
and reviews concerned with and discussing related issues testify to this. Fifthly, it must 
be stressed that an immense work of translations, commentaries, institution 
development has been done by political scientists and theorists. There has been, 
however, simply not enough resource to even touch upon serious issues such as 
legitimacy, types and processes of democracy, rule of law, separation of powers, 
sovereignty etc. to the required depth and degree. Finally, I would underline the 
importance of emigré Hungarians, the Lukács School, the Catholic-Conservative 
“School,” and many individual scholars, including some Western philosophers as well, 
who, by their works but often personally, have helped Hungarian political theory to be 
connected with the international community and who, perhaps inadvertently, gave 




1 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of the Journal as well as to András Körösényi and 
András Lánczi for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article. 
2 The first book I am aware of that inserts Hungary (as well as Poland and the Czech Republic) 
to a discussion of the history of political thought is Noel O’Sullivan in his European Political 
Thought Since 1945 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). He discusses István Bibó, Aurel Kolnai 
and Michael Polányi – see on them later.  
3 The character of the Horthy regime is itself a contested issue. It even became an actual issue of 
political debates after the regime change. Following the logic of politics, being pro or against the 
Horthy regime in terms of its historical achievements and crimes has become a major dividing 
line between the left and the right (this is similar to the Spanish debates about the Franco 
regime). My own view is summed up in the main text. Let me spell it out in some more detail 
here. The regime was indeed authoritarian from a 19th century liberal point of view, as were 
many European post-war regimes, however, it was more democratic then its predecessor, though 
still falling short of the Swiss, British, Scandinavian and French standards considerably. Again, 
despite its authoritarian tendencies, it preserved a substantial amount of liberal manners and 
procedures, especially the parliamentary control over the government, and resisted both the Nazi 
and Fascist “reform” movements quite efficiently. The unforgivable crime it committed was 
giving more and more room to antisemitism, introducing antisemitic laws and finally, under 
German pressure yet evidently not without significant internal support, eradicating the Jewish 
population in the countryside.  
4 For a discussions of Hungarian emigrant philosophers see Congdon (2001).  
5 János Kornai (1980), Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
6 As a prominent example, see Heller, Fehér and Márkus (1983). The authors belong to the 
“Budapest School,” that is, the disciplines of György Lukács. On this see Arato (1987); János 
Kis, György Bence, On Being a Marxist: A Hungarian View 
(http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5455/2354#.U6p7W0Db4Sk); Kis 
(1987); and Tamás (1983, 1989). These books were, at least in my memory, the first autonomous 
 





receptions of some contemporary Western political philosophical positions, liberalism, 
anarchism, and conservatism, respectively. 
7 See Bibó (1991). His book on international relations (Bibó, 1976), inspired by the lessons he 
drew from the failures of Central European peace treaties, was published in English and received 
favorable criticism. Another collection of his essays is forthcoming by the title The Art of 
Peacemaking, Selected Political Essays. Iván Z. Dénes is probably the most authoritative interpreter of 
Bibó’s ouevre.  
8 To be more precise, after the end of WWII there was, again, a considerable output of 
independent political thinking in Hungary that was shut down in 1948.  
9 The best known author in this field in Hungary is the prolific and polemical social theorist, now 
one of the judges of the Constitutional Court, Béla Pokol, a discipline of N. Luhmann. His 
thinking was also heavily influenced by J. Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. Being also well-
versed in Gramsci’s and Bourdieu’s theories, he has developed a peculiar mixture of strong 
antiliberalism (criticising liberal democracy and the liberal establishment), anti-neoconservatism 
(criticising capitalism), without ever returning to a Marxist or socialist theory of society and 
economy. 
10 For Foucault-inspired political history, see Rev (2005); Horvath and Szakolczai (1992); and 
Szakolczai (2003). 
11 Such as the monumental The History of Political Thought, edited by J. Cropsey and L. Strauss 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987); see also Miller et al. (1991) and Canning (1996). 
József Bayer, András Lánczi, Mátyás Bódig and Tamás Győrffy produced their own versions of 
the history of political thought, tailored to the needs of Hungarian higher education.  
12 One of the first representative volumes on the emerging democracy written by native scholars 
was Szoboszlai (1992). Another important book was Bozóki, Körösényi and Schöpflin (1992). 
13 See Pakulski and Körösényi (2012). Besides this book, András Körösényi, the leading theorist 
of the topic, has published numerous articles on the concept in English and in Hungarian. 
14 The institutional infrastructure of political science in Hungary is composed of the Institute of 
Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, with appr. 50 researchers (some of 
them part-time employed), ten university political science departments and institutions with appr. 
120 professors (rough estimate), and four doctoral schools. There are other relevant 
departments, e.g. Public Policy, Regional Studies or International Relations Departments as well. 
Since Hungary preserved the Soviet system of the Academy supervising the different sciences 
and arts, the Political Science Committee, the members of which are elected by scholars holding 
a PhD, is considered the highest forum of political science. Finally, the Hungarian Association of 
Political Science is a broad umbrella civil organisation, having around 250 members.  
15 Gábor Tóka and Zsolt Enyedi of the Central European University are perhaps the most 
frequently cited authors in this field.  
16 Representative authors with chapters and articles in English and German are Attila Ágh, 
György Hajnal, György Jenei, Máté Szabó. 
17 Márton Szabó is the founder of this school in Hungary (see, for instance, Szabó 2006). 
18 An outstanding representative of parliament and elite research is Gabriella Ilonszki, with a 
number of books available in English (For a recent book, see Ilonszki, 2010). Network theory 
applied to elite research is represented by Balázs Vedres who has published papers with David 
Stark (for a several award-winning piece see Vedres and Stark, 2010); and with László Bruszt (see 
Bruszt, Stark and Vedres, 2006); and by Károly Takács, who also has a strong record of English 
papers on networks, trust, social theory.  
19 See, for instance, Csanádi (2002, 2007).   
 





20 See for instance Bruszt and Stark (1998); Kornai (2008); and Bohle and Greskovits (2012). 
This latter book won the Stein Rokkan Prize in 2013. 
21 Representatives of this research area with English papers are András Bozóki and András 
Körösényi. 
22 Political ideologies are also discussed in and by social theory. The boundaries are, of course, 
easy to cross. It is perhaps worth mentioning that one of the most influential discussions of 
conservatism in sociology was developed by Karl Mannheim, another Hungarian emigré. 
23 See Tokes (1996). 
24 Authors with English output on these questions include, among others, Mátyás Bódig, Tamás 
Győrfi, András Jakab, Zoltán Miklósi, Zoltán Szente, and myself. 
25 Notable exceptions are János Frivaldszky and Péter Takács. 
26 Two journals may be considered as having a predilection toward liberalism, broadly 
understood: Beszélő (a monthly review, first published in 1981 in a samisdat form, since 2013 
only an online publication) and Fundamentum, a quarterly journal, with a strong emphasis on 
human rights. For shorter essays and discussions, two printed weeklies, ÉS and Magyar Narancs 
are the most widely known forums. The most influential liberal political philosophers are 
perhaps János Kis and Zoltán Miklósi. 
27 A representative example is Ferenc Horkay-Hörcher (2000).  
28 Jasay’s book on the state was translated. Actually, Ayn Rand and Hans-Hermann Hoppe are 
also available in Hungarian. 
29 The most influential conservative bi-monthly journal is the Kommentár. A more academic 
quarterly journal with a conservative mark is the Századvég, published online.  
30 It would exceed the limits of this analysis to explore the influence of religion and religious 
thinking on political philosophy but it is safe to make a brief suggestion about the strikingly close 
connection between conservative thinking and Catholicism. Molnar, Kolnai, J. Lukacs, M. 
Polanyi were not only nominally Catholic (in fact, except for Molnar, the three others were partly 
or entirely of Jewish extraction!) but practising Catholics, with Kolnai and Polanyi converting as 
adults. 
31 His chief interpretator is András Lánczi whose work has been strongly influenced by Strauss 
and who is the perhaps most widely known conservative political philosopher in Hungary.  
32 The most known advocate of Marxism as a political philosophy in Hungary is Gáspár Miklós 
Tamás, a former dissident, first an anarcho-liberal, later an Oakeshottean conservative.  
33 István Balogh is doing original research on Rawls, Habermas and Otfried Höffe. German 
conservatism is discussed extensively in András Karácsony’ books and papers.  
34 In May 2013, Roger Scruton held a public lecture at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
attended by the Prime Minister, too. In May 2014, Jürgen Habermas gave a talk at the Eötvös 
University (the PM wasn’t there), both lecture rooms were packed with students and scholars.  
35 See Eötvös (1996). The book(s) appeared first in German and later in Hungarian. In terms of 
coherence, conception and philosophical sense, this book is the greatest and consummate work 
of the dominant version of 19th century liberalism in Hungary. Tocqueville’s and Mill’s influence 
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